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CHRISTIAN M ISSION IN POST-COM M UNISM :
M ISSIOLOGICAL IM PLICATIONS AND THE BULGARIAN CONTEXT
by Viktor Kostov
Viktor Kostov holds a Ph.D. degree in missiology from Fuller Theological Seminary (2009).
He graduated from the law school of Sofia University, Bulgaria, in 1991 and since then has
been involved in practical and theoretical issues of church and state and religious liberty
in the post-communist context. A member of the Sofia Bar Association since 1992, Viktor
incorporates freedom of religion, conscience and speech as an observer and religious liberty
advocate in his missionary work based in Bulgaria. He is the founding editor of Freedom
for All, a leading internet magazine for dialogue on the issues of church, state and liberty
for the Bulgarian context. His articles on the subject matter have been published in
Christian periodicals in the US (Christian Century, Christianity Today) and Christian and
secular newspapers in Bulgaria.
“I personally am an atheist, but will always support Eastern Orthodoxy because I am aware
that only it can unite the Bulgarians and help them come out of the black hole in which they find
themselves at the moment. M y personal feelings and beliefs are of no importance when the survival
of the state is at stake.” This opinion posting, placed on the Internet under one of my articles
critiquing the government for its intervention in ecclesiastical affairs of the Orthodox Church,
expresses clearly the dilemma of religion, Christianity and its different forms in the postcommunist context of Bulgaria.
Purpose, Terminology and Scope
The goal of this presentation is to discuss the categories of freedom of conscience, religion
and the church-state relationship from a missiological perspective. In this paper I will present the
thesis that in post-communist Bulgaria, the government still attempts to play a defining role in the
formation of national ideology and thus attempts to govern religious belief. In such attempts the
idea of a canonical territory, or the limitations on free speech called for by any anti-proselytism
sentiments, are welcome by the state in its tendency to elevate itself above society and become a
totalitarian structure. I will also suggest that there is missiological significance in paying attention
to the church-state model, and to issues of freedom of conscience and religion in the postcommunist context.
Terminological clarification is needed here. I use the term “Orthodox” in this paper to
denote adherents to the Eastern Orthodox tradition. However, many uses of the term do not refer
to believers, or church-goers that visit Eastern Orthodox cathedrals and services, but depict a
national and ethnic adherence, often with nationalistic overtones.1 The very term “orthodox” in the
larger practice of Christianity is used to denote faithfulness to doctrine and practice. But faithful
to what: The Biblical canon or the Tradition of the Church? Faithfulness to the Holy Spirit or the
church hierarchy? W e are aware that Eastern Orthodoxy is faithful to church Tradition and the
“guided reading” of the Scriptures; whereas Evangelicalism stresses the Reformation principle of
sola scriptura. Thus if we want to refer to the practical use of Christian orthodoxy we are prohibited
to do so in order to avoid confusion in the use of the term in relation to the Eastern Orthodox
Church. Even this terminological disclaimer reveals how difficult the discussion of and with a
1

Parush Parushev, ‘Narrative Paradigms of Emergence’ in Religion in Eastern Europe XXV (2):1-39, 2005.
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church institution can be whose fundamental premise for its self-definition is the assumption that
it is the only institution that can represent ultimate truth.2 The task becomes daunting when we
establish that Orthodoxy also has a political claim in which it is not concerned with faith but with
its close relationship with the secular government.3
Therefore we must be ready to critically deconstruct certain theological presuppositions
as we discuss mission, civil and religious freedom, proselytism and freedom of conscience in the
post-communist world. One example is the term “Orthodox countries.”
Canonical Territory, Freedom of Religion and Proselytism
In order to establish a comprehensible framework for discussion, I will offer some working
definitions of terms. “Canonical territory” is present when we have a religion which has claimed
as adherents all subjects within a given geographical area controlled by a government. This idea
supports the historical presumption that all Bulgarians (or Armenians or Serbs or Russians or
Romanians, etc.) are established Orthodox (as in other countries the population is classified by the
official authorities as unanimously Catholic, M uslim, Hindu and so on). This presumption adopted
by the state and the public does not take into account the real spiritual experiences and convictions
of individuals and “missionaries are treated as invaders.” 4
“Freedom of religion” is the right of the person to choose for himself his faith in God, based
on the unhindered gathering of information on which to base his belief. “For himself” does not
mean that the person creates his own god; on the contrary, religious belief is always formed by, and
aimed at community and a faith that is meaningful and proven by experience and history. But the
historical and communal aspect of faith is not meant to eradicate individual freedom. The latter is
given so that the individual can reach internal conviction independently, so that belief is motivated
and thoughtfully weighed, not imposed on the person because of fear or violence.
“Proselytism” has a negative connotation and is generally used by religious and
government leaders who control certain canonical territory. The term is meant to denote the
activities of representatives from faiths or religions which are not recognized as the dominant one.
The activities envisioned include the presentation of “foreign” beliefs to people in the “canonical
territory.” 5
It is only logical that in a given “canonical territory” there is the presumption that everyone
is born with a certain “faith affiliation.” From a theological and Biblical perspective, this argument
is untenable, and I would say, preposterous. Faith is not race, ethnicity, gender or even culture; it
is the result of personal involvement in the process of searching, understanding and accepting God
who is invisible and is Spirit. This search for God may be influenced by the family and social
processes of the person’s environment. But to limit the spiritual search of man because of political,
ethnic, territorial and state interests is tyranny, which at least from a Christian and Biblical
perspective, is not justified. This tyranny, at the same time, is powerless in many ways, because
God reveals himself to people, despite the efforts of people to reformulate faith in him (Acts 4:31).

2

Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 250.
Nikolas Gvosdev, An Examination of Church-State Relations in the Byzantine and Russian Empires with an Emphasis
on Ideology and Models of Interaction (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001). See also Lee Trepanier, ‘Nationalism
and Religion in Russian Civil Society: An Inquiry into the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience,’ In Civil Society and the
Search for Justice in Russia, edited by N. G. a. C. Marsh (New York: Lexington Books, 2002).
4
Tim Grass, ‘Orthodoxy and the Doctrine of the Church’ in Ian M. Randall (ed), Baptists and the Orthodox Church:
On the Way to Understanding (Prague, Czech Republic: International Baptist Theological Seminary, 2003), pp. 5-14, p. 12.
5
Ibid.
3
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Faith is a matter of internal conviction, according to the gospel, which does not belong to control
by the state (Caesar) (John 6; M atthew 22:21).
M an is not born with his religion, but builds his convictions on the basis of the culture that
has formed him as a child and youth; then in later years he may choose to contest the worldview
imposed upon him during earlier years. Similar stance, but starting from another point of view, is
the position of secular humanism, which protects basic individual human rights.
Human Rights and Religious Liberty
Freedom of conscience and religion began to be more clearly defined as socio-political
categories during the Enlightenment period which places them historically as a development of
W estern thought. Freedom of religion is only one subcategory of the attempt at universal human
justice, known as “universal human rights.” These rights are established in international treaties
and documents of the human global community since its emergence in an organized form in the
20th century. Such is the case with the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights by the United
Nations. Article 18 defines the right to freedom of faith, its expression and the right to change one’s
faith. Although the UDHR is a pretentious document, and it cannot be otherwise since the claim
of the proponents of the document is to establish some form of a “universal human justice,” it still
remains a fundamental reference point for understanding and claiming the fundamental right of
a free belief in God.
Human rights are also viewed as a biblical category, emerging in the act of creation and the
dignity of man (and woman) created in God’s image.6 Although the idea of human dignity is found
in the Bible the term “hum an rights” is not found in the scriptures.7 Humanists and atheists,
especially regarding freedom of religion, have their own claim on religious liberty. Franklin
Gamwell for example insists that all religion must be excluded from public and political life
because it is “irrational.”8 Hamburger’s research reveals that Thomas Jefferson’s, the founding
father of the American constitution, motivation for insisting on a “wall of separation of church and
state” was rather to protect his own disagreement with clerical establishment than to protect
religion.9 Therefore freedom of religion must be considered with an accompanying term “freedom
of conscience.” The meaning of such a differentiation is that one is also free to not believe in God,
according to their choice of conviction. The humanist interpretation of “freedom of conscience and
religion” is in fact the protection of freedom from religion. Freedom of conscience is the ability to
hold any conviction; freedom of religion is the ability to hold and express one’s faith in God.
Freedom of religion and conscience is a complex category because it contains in itself
theological, legal, political, social and cultural subcategories. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court
issued an interpretive decision addressing the complexity of religious freedom as a legal category
in the early 1990s. Religious liberty is complex because it consists of the internal right of freedom
of conscience, to choose whom to worship, and several rights to externally express that internal
faith.10 These are the freedoms of speech and expression, receiving and gathering information, of

6

Max L. Stackhouse, Creeds, Society, and Human Rights (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984).
Eugene Heideman, "The Missiological Significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," Missiology:
An International Review, 2000 XXVIII,: 163-76.
8
Franklin I. Gamwell, The Meaning of Religious Freedom: Modern Politics and the Democratic Resolution (New York:
State University of New York, 1995).
9
Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 2002).
10
Ðåøåíèå ¹ 5 îò 11 þíè 1992 ã. ïî êîíñòèòóöèîííî äåëî ¹ 11 îò 1992 ã., (Îáí., ÄÂ, áð. 49 îò 16.06.1992
ã.) [Constitutional Court Decision No. 5 of 11 June 1992 on Constitutional Court Case No. 11 of 1992, Published in State
Gazette, Issue 49 of 16 June 1992].
7
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association (forming of a religious entity) and gathering indoors and outdoors without or with
government permission. Thus when we speak of the freedom of conscience and religion we must
be able to grasp the framework of church-state relations.
Church and State
The model of church to state relationship is also critically important for the assessment of
the level of freedom the church is granted to worship and do mission. Johannes Verkyul accurately
notes that regardless of the political regime, the mission of the church to preach the good news of
Christ cannot be reconsidered or redefined.11 An example along those lines is presented by the
apostles. They teach honor to the king and respect to all authority yet resolutely disobey official
orders not to preach in the name of Jesus (Acts 4, 5). However, the missiological analysis of the
actual political order in which the church operates may help reshape and reinvigorate the actual
missionary vision of the church.
David Bosch presents five different models on church-state relations which significantly
differ in how the church engages in mission:
1. Constantinian model – which “presupposes a close alliance between a particular
religious organization and the state;
2. The Pietist model – religious organization and powers that be are fully separated;
3. Reformist model – mission is more than soul-winning and church-planting; includes
social and moral uplift and seeks structural changes;
4. Liberationist model – rejects both Constantinianism and Reformist confrontation with
the forces of evil, revolutionist mentality;
5. The Anabaptist model – the church is a prophetic community, separated from any
government favor, and by its very existence, even under oppressive political regimes,
testifies of the Kingdom of God.12
These models reflect theological convictions and historical social context in which the
church operates. However, they do not offer a clear-cut formula since they overlap. In more
suppressive political regimes the church remains a prophetic insertion in a corrupt and dark
society. In more favorable-toward-the-church’s-influence societies one may see Bosch’s concern
with the church identifying itself too closely with the state and thus losing its prophetic ministry.
Bosch’s main conclusion is that the church must preserve its witness in a way that it provides the
uniting factor of values that any society needs to survive. Yet he is wary of too close a relationship
between church and state where the government can influence the church’s definition of mission.
Christendom (Constantinianism), where canonical territory is a part of the church’s domain, is a
defunct context for the missionary church.13
W alter Pilgrim studies the NT models of church and state relations. His conclusions lead
him to establish a threefold general “formula” of church and state. In the life and ministry of Jesus
he sees “critical distancing;” in the letters of the apostles the pattern is “subordination” of the
church to the state; and in the book of Revelation Pilgrim extracts the model of “resistance.” Certain
adjustments must be made to Pilgrim’s conclusions: for example, the term “subordination” does
11

Johannes Verkyul, “The Biblical Notion of Kingdom: Test of Validity for Theory of Religion” in The Good News
of the Kingdom: Mission Theology for the Third Millenium, edited by C. V. Engen, D. S. Gilliland and P. Pierson. (Eugene, OR:
Wipf and Stock Publishers,1999), p. 72.
12
David J. Bosch, “God's Reign and the Rulers of This World: Missiological Reflections on Church-State
Relationships” in The Good News of the Kingdom: Mission Theology for the Third Millenium, edited by C. V. Engen, D. S.
Gilliland and P. Pierson. (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1999).
13
Ibid.
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not depict well the respectful attitude to which Christians are called to in Romans 13 and 1 Peter
2:13-17. Acts 4 and 5 are examples that in regards to the question to whom the Christian’s
conscience and its free speech expression belong, the answer is, as long as preaching is concerned,
that Caesar has no right over that area. Thus the term “subordination” which expresses full
obedience in all matters neglects the area of free conscience and speech which are preserved as the
untouchable domain of believers.
Pilgrim’s study however is exhaustive enough to trust one of his main conclusions: the NT
does not provide any definitive model of church and state relations. The church must evaluate its
own political context and define its stance toward the government based on the principles provided
in the NT.
Bosch’s and Pilgrim’s views are complemented by Carter’s and Fergusson’s conclusions
which focus on contemporary developments. The former insists that Christendom in the W est is
in a state of decay and the church must prepare for redefining its place in society:
[Christendom] is the concept of W estern civilization as having a religious arm (the
church) and a secular arm (civil government), both of which are united in their
adherence to the Christian faith, which is seen as the so-called soul of Europe or
the W est… W ithin this Christian civilization, the state and the church have
different roles to play, but, since membership in both is coterminous, both can be
seen as aspects of one unified reality— Christendom.14
The idea of a “Christian society” or a “Christian state” in the W est is further challenged by
Fergusson: “The complex interweaving of systems that constitute a modern western society has
ended the earlier alignment of ecclesiastical and political rule.”15 Yoder poses the poignant question
and responds to it: “W hy then should there be anything wrong with Christianity’s becoming an
official ideology?...In the experience of the Christian community… the only way in which the faith
can become the official ideology of a power elite in a given society is if Jesus Christ ceases to be
completely Lord.” 16
This up to date W estern developm ent cannot be ignored when we look into Eastern
nations, especially when we are tempted to term them “Orthodox nations.” Any formulaic mission
strategy tends to be incomplete or reductionist; a truly strategic missional thinking is rather a
faithful sensitivity to the Holy Spirit and the mandates of Scripture.17 This is also true when we
think of a missiologically viable church and state formula.
Is Post-communist Bulgaria an “Orthodox Country?”
W e may take notice of the revival of the concept “Orthodox peoples” and Orthodox
countries and the terminology in the post-com munist milieu but, in fact, there is a big disparity
between public use of words and reality. In “Orthodox” countries, there is no clear distinction
between Orthodox theology as doctrine and practice and the term “Orthodox” as a national identity
and as a political stimulant of government self-confidence. This statement refers to the Bulgarian
context as well. Samuel Huntington by no accident affords himself generalizing statements and
categorizations, lumping together the East— both Islam and Orthodoxy—into the same category,
14

Craig A. Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture: A Post-Christendom Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press,

2006), p. 78.
15

David Fergusson, Church, State, and Civil Society (Cambridge: University Press, 2004), p. 192.
John Howard Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1984), p. 85.
17
Wilbert Shenk, “Three Studies of Mission Strategy: Transforming Mission” in Anabaptism and Mission, edited
by W. R. Shenk and P. E. Penner (Prague, Czech Republic: IBTS and Neufeld Verlag, 2007), p. 23.
16
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identifying the entire society with a single religion.18 Huntington’s wide sweep naturally omits the
details— namely that despite the prevailing “political vision of Orthodoxy” in the so-called
"Orthodox" countries (former communist) there are other cultural currents. Among them are the
tendency of post-communist societies to seek association with the markets and the values of the
W est.
The next important limitation to the term “Orthodox state” or “Orthodox nation” is that
the rubber-stamp use of terminology leads to serious conceptual and mental confusion. W hat is an
“Orthodox country?” Are Orthodox priests in such a nation government officials at the same time,
as in the era of Rum Millet?19 Or are they officials appointed by the Council of M inisters and the
local government? Does the public administration by law serve only people who have declared
loyalty to the Orthodox religion? Or is it that only people who have declared their loyalty to the
Orthodox Church, (and what does “loyalty” mean anyway— only baptized members or regular
visitors of liturgies?), may be elected to state-leadership positions? In this last case, Orthodoxy
should be termed to be the official state religion. But since Orthodoxy is only “the traditional”
religion, such a formulation would violate the constitution and the principle of pluralism in a
democratic society (Art. 11, Para. 2). Finally, can we draw a sign of equality between “Orthodox
Church” and “nation”; or between “state” and “society”?
Bulgaria’s adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Human
Rights and Freedoms which lists in Article 9 the right to believe, express one’s belief and change
one’s beliefs, speaks to the opposite. In this secular document one can discover not only the right
of the human being to believe in God and tell others about it, but also to convert and change one’s
religious or atheist convictions. The accession of Bulgaria into the EU in 2007 put even more starkly
before the government and society the need to evaluate its attitudes toward human rights and in
particular the freedom of religion and conscience.
The constitutional claim that the “traditional religion in Bulgaria is Eastern Orthodoxy”
(Art. 13, Para. 3), also produces difficult-to-distinguish categories in the hard to find balance
between pluralism and “national unity.”20 This claim has its limitations placed by the constitutional
prohibition against the imposition of a state ideology (and “religion” by analogy) (Art. 11, Para. 2).
However, given the low level of religious education of the population in the post-comm unist
situation, and the obvious appetite of former communists to take advantage of the dominant role
of Orthodoxy in the minds of people as a political and national uniting factor, the fine distinction
between “traditional” and “mandatory and official” religion becomes even more nebulous. The
constitutionally mandated separation between state and religious institutions (Art. 13 para.2) and
the ban on the use of religion for political (government) objectives are also violated by the
authorities without any inhibitions.21 W e may conclude that “proselytism” and “canonical
territory” are categories which in their constrictive meaning come into sharp conflict with the
freedom of conscience and religion, as these are established at the highest level in the legal
framework of Bulgaria.

18

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster,

1996).
19

Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 98.
The Russian Orthodox Church expressed its struggle with the concept in a special document: Laurie Johnston,
“Religious Liberty in Comparative Perspective: The Catholic Church’s Theological Odyssey and the Bases of the Social
Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church” in Religion in Eastern Europe XXVI, 2006, (4):15-31.
21
“Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and Others against Bulgaria, The” in European Court of Human
Rights Web Site: European Court of Human Rights Court Decisions, 2009.
20
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However, assertions that Bulgaria is an Orthodox country have their undeniable basis. W e
will not delve into common historical facts about the christening of the Bulgarian people, and the
role of the Orthodox Church as a quasi-governmental and national institution which maintained
the Bulgarian spirit throughout the centuries. The following table shows that law-making in the
modern history of Bulgaria is marked by the pursuit of establishing a single, corporate conscience,
in which freedom of the individual is of secondary importance.
In this sense, yes, we do have an Orthodox state. The legislature (one of the forms of state
power) seems to have always strived to steer the conscience of the people toward the field of
Orthodox doctrine as a state-sponsored, religio-political ideology. After W W II the centrality of
Orthodoxy as a faith promoted by the state was superseded legally by atheistic communism. But
where is the liberating transcendence of personal relationship with God in these forms of political
“ethno-religion?”
TABLE 1
FREEDOM OF BELIEF AND CONSCIENCE
IN THE M ODERN BULGARIAN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1878
Constitutional
M onarchy

1949
Communism

1971
Communism

1991
Postcommunist
period

Turnovo Constitution

Denominations Act

Constitution

Constitution

2002
Post-communist
period

Law on Religious
Confessions
Art. 37: “The ruling Art. 3: “The Bulgarian
Art. 1(2): “The leading Art. 13 (3):
Art. 10 (1): “The traditional
faith in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is the role in society and the “Eastern
religion in the Republic of
Principality is the
traditional religious
government (state)
Orthodox
Bulgaria is the Eastern
Orthodox-Christianity confession of the
belongs to the
Christianity
Orthodoxy. It plays a
of Eastern
Bulgarian people, and as Bulgarian communist shall be
historic role in Bulgarian
confession.”
such, in its form, content party.”
considered the statehood and has actual
and spirit, could be a
traditional
meaning in the state’s life.”
people’s democratic
religion in the
church.”
Republic of
Bulgaria.”

M echanism of Totalitarianism
The idea of the national state represents a form of government which stems from the
ancient tradition to add spiritual m eaning to the use of secular power. It is also a platform for
interlacing the Enlightenment humanistic ideals and the nationalism of emerging nations,
especially in the 19th and 20th century. Some may see a benevolent force behind the attempt of the
nation-state to unify different groups.22 Craig Carter’s view is less attracted to the possibilities
offered by the nation-state formation: “The nation-state demands the absolute sacrifice from us. Just
as Jesus demands that we make ourselves ready to die for him, the nation-state also demands that
we make ourselves ready to die for it.”23 Lesslie Newbigin’s treatment is significant with its
simplicity: “The nation-state has taken the place of God as the source to which we look for
22

Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, “A Timely Conversation with The Desire of the Nations on Civil Society, Nation
and State” in A Royal Priesthood?: The Use of the Bible Ethically and Politically A Dialogue with Oliver O'Donovan, edited by
C. Bartolomew, J. Chaplin, R. Song and A. Wolters. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2002).
23
Carter, p. 104.
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happiness, health and welfare.” 24 It is unarguable however that the nation-state has revealed a
modern capacity for attempt at total social and ideological control. Earlier in the 20 th century
Franklin Littell reinforced this view— he saw the role of the totalitarian state in using individual
appeal to transfer loyalty of members of the Christian community to loyalty of the political
community which shares a “political faith.” Littell quotes a fragment of the Nazi program on
“religious liberty:” “W e demand the freedom of all religious confessions in the state, in so far as
they do not imperil its stability or offend against the ethical and moral senses of the German race.” 25
Religion can support a totalitarian state ideology if pushed enough toward identification with
nationalistic values.
Totalitarianism without the use or the threat of state force is impossible. Thus the
mechanism of totalitarianism necessarily involves the process of turning the state from a governing
civil authority into an idolatrous, transcendent entity. All tyrannical government regimes, including
those most emblematic of the 20th century, National Socialism and communism, exhibit an
attraction toward the state system as an ideological tool. The foundation of communism and
totalitarianism is a state-imposed ideology and an idolatrous atheistic system of worship.
Idolatry is the worst sin of all, because it moves God to the periphery of our lives
and puts something else in his place. It gives to som ething else the glory that
should be God’s alone… The modern world is no less given over to idolatry than
the ancient one; it is just that its cruder forms were more prevalent then.26
A totalitarian state creates a totalitarian society, the result of which is totalitarian thinking. The
method for creating a totalitarian society contains two main components: (1) violence against
opponents of those of different convictions and (2) manipulation of the masses through
propaganda. Thus, through the inculcation of fear totalitarian leaders create conditions for selfcensorship and the reformulation of truth. By propaganda tyrants replace terminology and mental
categories for people and tailor their views according to their own desired ideology. David Bosch
even thinks that the development of technology makes all modern states totalitarian to a great
extent.27
Naturally, the abuse of truth on a large scale leads to the rewriting of history. These are the
favorite methods of the “favorite” tyrants and leaders of totalitarian ideologies and states: Lenin
argued that a lie repeated many times becomes truth and Hitler realized the need to create a matrix,
a new virtual reality, in the m inds of the people through propaganda of his own vision of the
“truth.”28 This matrix has a strict hierarchy of the quality of the human person: Arians are a higher
race, the Jews are not human beings and therefore subject to destruction, and Slavs are sub-human
categories and must be ruled and when necessary— destroyed. The Communists have their “class
enemy,” “the capitalist” and “the Kulak” for the formation of their own ideology of hate.
It would not be difficult to imagine modern Bulgarian media mini-ideologists of the
“totality” of state, nation and religion, call on “the Orthodox” Bulgarian people to be cleansed of
impurities, sects and other harmful elements.29 Post-communist Bulgarian media overflows with

24

Newbigin, cited in Carter, 2006, p. 104.
Franklin H.. Littell, The Free Church (Boston, MS: Starr King Press, 1957), p. 92.
26
Barry Webb, The Message of Isaiah: On Eagle's Wings. Edited by J. A. Motyer and J. R. Stott, The Bible Speaks Today
(Leicester, England: InterVarsity, 1996), p.180.
27
Bosch, 1999.
28
Adolf
Hitler,
Mein
Kampf
n.d. [cited April 1
2 0 0 9 ]. A v a i l a b l e f r o m
http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch06.html.
29
Ãåðìàíîâà, Ìëàäåíà, è Äåñèñëàâà Ïàíàéîòîâà. 2008. Ñåêòè çàðèáÿâàò ñ ìàãèè è õèïíîçà. Òåëåãðàô.
[Germanova, Mladena and Desislava, Panayotova. 2008. Sects Lure with Magic and Hypnosis. Telegraph.], p. 13.
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reports of this sort without paying attention to the fact that the fight against “sectarianism” is
actually a struggle for dominance of the total and totalitarianism.30 Part of the propaganda is that
“sects” (different religions), which are seen as breaking away from the “whole,” the “total,” are
called...“totalitarian.”
It is not accidental that the Communists, National Socialists, fascist and radical Islamic
fundamentalists rely on propaganda to create public awareness and an atmosphere in which
tyranny and totalitarianism are presented as necessary. One of the most notorious totalitarian
leaders of all time illustrates this in his reflections on propaganda, which he thinks should not be
directed at intellectuals, but at the masses:
The function of propaganda does not lie in the scientific training of the individual,
but in calling the masses' attention to certain facts, processes, necessities, etc.,
whose significance is thus for the first time placed within their field of vision. The
whole art consists in doing this so skillfully that everyone will be convinced that
the fact is real, the process necessary, the necessity correct, etc.31
Freedom of conscience and faith are excluded as a value in this model of the battle for the mind and
soul of the people.
Charles G. Robertson, observing from a close historical proximity the emergence of the 20 th
century totalitarian states, gives three of its important features: (1) the state is seen as a transcendent
entity and the unity it promotes confers on itself an “absolute value’, intrinsic and inherent in itself,
with which empirical facts are to harmonize. “The state, in fact, is a moral absolute of eternal value;
arising from the nature of things… As M ussolini put it: “The state is the synthesis of all the material
and non-material values of the race.”32 The end of the state is the achievement of this synthesis of
values.33 The second consequence, Robertson points out, is that (2) the totalitarian state demands,
and is empowered by, a specific approach to government: “unqualified allegiance of the citizens
to the state makes it a Totalitarian State.”34 The definition that emerges in the text is that “the State
is, therefore, a unifying corporative organism of differentiated functional capacities organized
under the supreme, unifying and equalizing control of the Leader (Duce, Führer), who speaks the
mind of the state and is its consummate expression.”35 Thirdly, the writer sees a com mon trend
among all totalitarian states at his time (Russia, Turkey, Germany and Italy)— they all came about
as the result of a revolution bringing change from a past humiliating national experience.
In totalitarianism the state achieves an overwhelming presence in society to the point of
identification with it.36 The state permeates the whole society, and controls all activities. The public
recognizes the state as a major source of security, progress and protection, giving it respect and a
transcendent admiration, bordering on idolatry.
To sum up briefly: tyrannical totalitarianism acts through the inculcation of fear, hatred
and violence and through manipulation. (Fear is imaginary and usually strongly enhanced by
propaganda – popular phraseology used by the Bulgarian media to denote non-Orthodox groups
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include “the sects will steal the souls of the young,” “totalitarian sects,” “lie in waiting around the
street corner,” “luring,” etc.) Once the people lose their sense of reality and dignity under this
influence, the masses who have adopted these values as good for society, identify themselves with
tyranny and agree with its methods. Upon agreeing with tyranny they begin to implement it in
favor of the tyrannical regime.
In these circumstances, the human conscience is put on trial: to totally subjugate to the
popular social and governmental dem and to conform or to risk and hold on to freedom and be
declared a “sect” which is separate from the whole. And, naturally, to suffer the consequences for
having “unconventional” beliefs. Thus the totalitarian mechanism is largely an attitude, and is not
solely imposed by state coercion. Of course, the principles of the tyrannical mechanism offered here
should serve as a starting point for reflections on the Bulgarian post-communist context.
The Church as a Deterrent
The grim picture is relieved by our awareness of the church as a prophetic and free
community in the larger society, which could be tyrannical or free, in a political sense. Robertson
describes the church as a society of free people with a transcendent relationship to God, who form
a community based on their beliefs and faith.37 This definition contains the transcendent aspects
of faith, which immediately transforms the religious community into a group largely independent
from public ideology. In this sense, tyrannical or free, the society within which the church exists
only in part forms the worldview of the people in the church. People therefore are not only persons
carrying the marks of surrounding circumstances: political, social, economic, etc. Just the opposite,
the main feature of their conscience is their faith in God, who is a transcendent Spirit that is
unfathomable and uncontrolled by the limited perceptions of the five senses and the four
dimensions of the visible world: height, length, width and time.
M artinus Kuitert, Dutch theologian, agrees with Robertson— the church has a social
element in itself that makes it a political category, but only somewhat.38 In essence society cannot
dictate to the church the latter’s nature and formation. The world lacks the categories of faith, but
the church has spiritual autonomy from the secular power.
According to Robertson there are several principles that distinguish the church from any
ordinary public organization: (1) the equality of all in dignity and value before God, (2) the ultimate
goal of the church is outside of the visible world, (3) the church has a “spiritual autonomy”
independence, without which it “ceases to be the church,” (4) government has no authority to grant
any spiritual power or authority to the church - “it can only recognize, but not confer, the inherent
rights of the Christian Church to spiritual autonomy,” (5) the sphere of the church and that of the
state are different: the former extends into the field of “individual conscience and the relation of
the human soul to God” and the latter “is the maintenance of the political order of its members and
their obligations to obey the laws and officers within the sphere of the state’s civil jurisdiction,” and
(6) rejects any identification between state and society, at least, because society includes the
Christian community.39
Here is the fundamental misunderstanding between the world of the secular and the faith.
Agnostics and atheists think that believers worship some unreal god and are delusional. This leads
to a condescending attitude towards religion and religious people. But for people who believe, the
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situation is the reverse— unbelievers have no receptors for spiritual truths and experiences that are
only achievable in the world of faith (1 Cor. 2). Thus the secular faction sees in religion only a
group of people who because of inadequacy cannot be full members of society. Believers see it in
exactly the opposite fashion— they are aware that not fewer, but more resources are available to
them to be full citizens, precisely because they have the fear of God who gives wisdom and selfcontrol, qualities absent among the godless.
Only Christianity (Non-Roman and non-E. Orthodox) respects religious liberty.
W hat gives rise to anxiety is that, apart from this one form of the Christian
consciousness [non-Roman] no other religion, no other society, no other ideology,
is prepared to grant to religious liberty its proper position as a supreme and
sacrosanct principle. All religions and ideologies tend at one moment or another
to attach importance to unity, to conformity, to the total claims of a civilization or
of a historical religion, or simply to the practical liberty of a man to earn his daily
bread. 40
Namely the practice of the Christian hope for life that continues after the end of the earthly one,
as well as the fear of God, which is “the beginning of all wisdom,” gives the church the ability to
be a prophetic corrective against the tyranny of self-obsessed leaders, ideologists of violence and
manipulation, and government totalitarian structures. The correction does not happen, however,
by the participation of the church as such in government, but rather by it holding a position of a
different type in society. The church is a society which is a counterpoint to the lies, greed, envy,
hatred, passions and intrigues that make up all other societies. The task of the Church is to assess
the secular government and by using its non-revolutionary but powerful spiritual weapons— of
preaching and prayer— to keep the fire of truth and freedom burning even in the most tyrannical
societies.
Therefore the church, which identifies blindly with political power in order to preserve
itself as an institution, ceases to be a corrective and a conveyor of freedom. W ithout applying any
checks against the aspiration for political power it has all the capacity to become an ally of tyranny
and turn into a totalitarian institution itself.
Bringing Together Christian M ission and Freedom of Religion
Thus we reach the summary that the institutional church, bound by policy and not by the
essence and spirit of the gospel is more conducive to state ideology and policy, is not a free
community and a corrective to violence and tyranny. In this role, such a church, regardless of
whether it is Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant, easily becomes the controller of the “canonical
territory” in order to maintain its influence and nature of a quasi-religious political institution. On
the other hand, regardless of its denomination, a church which accepts biblical teachings on
ecclesial m atters despite its denominational baggage can be transformed into a community that
encourages personal freedom through personal faith in God. Such a church can also play the role
of a public corrective exactly because of this faith and its inherent freedom: “The Christian notion
of religious liberty by no means includes any element of indifferentism, relativism or syncretism.
Christians consider God’s revelation as the absolute and unique truth, but demand religious liberty
for all, including erring men, in spite of that absoluteness.” 41
Freedom of conscience and religion is embedded in Christ’s great missionary
commissioning of the apostles and disciples to preach to all nations. Put differently, the preaching
40
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of the “good news” with “all authority” does not contain coercion, but respect toward the choice
of the other, without fear about the preacher’s reputation and success.
Then Jesus came to them and talked to them, saying: All authority in heaven and
on earth has been given to me. Go therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in
the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all
things I have commanded you: and lo, I am with you through all the days to the
end of the century. [Amen] (M atthew 28:18-20).
Thus the missionary effort is meant to challenge respectfully but firmly the very existence of the
category “canonical territory” as a bulwark of some “default” territorial spirituality.42 With this
view in mind, “proselytism” is not a negative term. The sharing of ideas and beliefs becomes an
opportunity to expand one’s worldview or a way to battle mental strongholds imposed on the
people by fear and authoritarianism. And here precisely is the cross-point between missionary
work, the preaching of the Bible as God's word, on the one hand, and the guarantees to respect
freedom of conscience, religion and expression, on the other, enshrined in secular and humanistic
documents and laws.
Each missionary-minded church then has two main characteristics: respecting the freedom
of the recipient, but also protecting its right to preach the faith. This position is contrary to that of
the “religious institution” which bulwarks its canonical territory: not respecting the rights of its
followers to receive information about other treatments of Christianity as it considers them
immature to form their own opinion; and hence to not lose them as church adherents it opposes
free speech, freedom of conscience and the legal system which protects individual rights.
In this sense, “the good news” should remain “good” and not be imposed by force or
government coercion.43 In Christ we see a personal identity which does not hesitate in the
fulfillment of divine purposes. Christ was convincing not by imposing his will on others, but rather
by imposing his will upon himself: to obey the specific mission and will of God. Such obedience
is possible because Christian hope envisions the full realization of God's kingdom in the unfolding
of hum an history, in which Christ will not be the Injured Servant, but rather the ruler who will
exercise his visible reign over human civilization.
Due to an absence of such hope for the future, any religious and ideological doctrine, which
does not put its trust in the authentic Christ, sooner or later will resort to the power of government
coercion, or totalitarianism, in order to realize its kingdom in the minds of people in the structures
of society. Christian faith has a duty to stay away from any attempt to use public authorities to
establish the principles of God’s kingdom by compulsion. At the same time we should not live
under the illusion that the struggle for salvation and absolute truth, hence the battle for freedom,
will cease and perfect peace will somehow be established, before the final consumption of the
modern world as we know it.
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